






To choose between these hypotheses we need to measure people’s propensity
to share. To do that, I played two games (the Ultimatum and Dictator Games)
with Hadza hunter-gatherers. Despite their ubiquitous food sharing, the
Hadzaarelesswillingtoshareinthesegamesthanpeopleincomplexsocieties
are. They were also less willing to share in smaller camps than larger camps.
I evaluate the various food-sharing hypotheses in light of these results.
INTRODUCTION
Among mammals, when food sharing occurs at all it is usually limited to the
provisioning of offspring (or mates), although wider sharing occurs among some
cooperative breeders like wild dogs (Solomon & French, 1997). Adult lions will
oftenshareacarcassbutnotwithoutalotofsnarling(Packer&Pusey,1997).When
a chimpanzee kills a colobus monkey, certain adults may get a share if they beg
with outstretched hand or slowly reach for the meat (McGrew & Feistner, 1992;
Mitani & Watts, 2000). In contrast, among human foragers (and some other types
ofsocieties),thereiswidespreadsharingoffoodoutsidethehouseholdwhichdoes
not even require begging; e.g. Hadza (Woodburn, 1998), Aka (Kitanishi, 1998),
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Ache (Kaplan & Hill, 1985), Hiwi (Gurven et al., 2000), Australian societies
(Peterson, 1993). Here, I evaluate what motivates this food sharing using data
from games I played with Hadza hunter-gatherers in Tanzania. In contrast to most
studies of food sharing, which focus on the pattern of food transfers and then infer
something about motives (for a review see Gurven, n.d.), my goal here is to draw
attention to motivation itself.
Two games that measure sharing propensity are the ultimatum and dictator
games. In the ultimatum game (UG) the ﬁrst player (proposer) must decide how to
divide a given amount of stakes with the second, anonymous player (responder).
If the responder accepts the anonymous proposer’s offer, he or she receives that
amount and the proposer gets the remainder, e.g. if the stakes are $100 and the
proposer offers $10, and the responder accepts, the responder gets $10 and the
proposer gets $90. On the other hand, if the responder rejects the proposer’s offer,
both receive nothing. Thus, the responder can, at a cost to herself, punish the
proposer for making a low offer. The dictator game (DG) is played exactly like
the UG except that the second player cannot reject an offer. Thus, the proposer
can dictate the division.
The UG elicits one’s propensity to share (if proposer) or punish (if responder).
TheDGrevealsone’swillingnesstosharewhenthereisnorisk.Standardeconomic
theory suggests the UG responder should accept any offer above zero, since
something beats nothing. Because the proposer should ﬁgure this out, he or she
should offer only one unit above zero in the UG. Zero is the expected offer in the
DG. Experiments in complex societies, however, have shown that proposers offer
muchmore.Infact,themodalUGofferis50%andmodalDGofferbetween30and
50% (Camerer & Thaler, 1995). UG offers in complex societies seem irrationally
high, unless responders reject offers above 0%, and they do. Offers under 20%
have about a 50% chance of being rejected (Henrich, 2000).
In addition to the Hadza, fourteen other small-scale societies played the UG in a
MacArthurFoundationexperimentaleconomicsproject,andIoccasionallyreferto
thoseresults.Iusethesegamestoanalyzefoodsharingbecausetheyprovideinsight
into motives not always clear from the pattern of food sharing itself. By motives I
mean something like individual goals, which may or may not be conscious.
Explanations of Food Sharing
Table 1 enumerates the following explanations of food sharing.
(1) Mutualism. In some contexts, there is no beneﬁt to defecting in a cooperative
venture. For example, when two or more individuals have a much greaterWhat Explains Hadza Food Sharing? 71
Table 1. Food Sharing Explanations.
1. Mutualism (food for foraging partners)
2. Nepotism (food for kin)
3. Reciprocity
(a) Not-in-kind exchange (food A for food B)
(b) In-kind, delayed reciprocity (food now for food later)
4. Costly signaling (food for non-food beneﬁts)
5. Tolerated scrounging (food for peace)
chance of getting some meat by attacking prey at the same time, cooperative
hunting can evolve, and this might result in all hunters getting some of the
spoils, as perhaps among lions (Packer & Pusey, 1997). This does not mean
that food shared following cooperative foraging is an example of mutualism,
only that in such a context, it must be considered.
(2) Nepotism.Individualsshouldbewillingtogivefoodtokinwhenthecost(C)
to the giver is less than the beneﬁt (B) to the recipient, times the coefﬁcient
of relatedness (r) between giver and recipient (C < B × r) (Hamilton, 1964).
Selection can favor a gene that promotes such behavior, so sharing food with
close kin presents no puzzle and female mammals have evolved specialized
organs (mammary glands) to do just this.
(3a) Not-in-kind Exchange. This entails the exchange (often immediate) of one
type of resource for another, such as meat for berries. This must account
for some of the sharing between husbands and wives who bring in different
kindsoffoodsandtheneatsomeoftheirspouse’sfood(Winterhalder,1986).
Not-in-kind exchange may also include food for non-food goods (or perhaps
services),andmayaccountformateprovisioningifthatisthepriceformating
access.
(3b) In-kind, Delayed Reciprocity. When there is considerable daily variance in a
foragers’ food returns and little correlation in daily returns across foragers,
givingfoodtootherswillpay–solongasitisreciprocated–becausethiswill
make it more likely one will get something to eat everyday (Winterhalder,
1986). The evolution of reciprocity is facilitated when individuals live in
small groups, regularly interact, keep track of others’ interactions, and have
a high probability of future interactions (Axelrod, 1984; Trivers, 1971), all
featuresofhumanforagers.However,someforagersmaybemoreproductive
than others, either because they are more skilled or because they try harder,
and end up giving out much more food than they receive (Hawkes et al.,
1991). This makes delayed reciprocity riskier and potentially less balanced
than immediate, not-in-kind exchange.72 FRANK W. MARLOWE




for services. However, if a man shares his meat with all in camp, there is no
incentiveforanyindividualwomantorepayhimwithsexifshereceivesmeat
without doing so. Costly signaling proposes a similar motivation and payoff,
but avoids the collective action problem inherent in the showoff hypothesis
becauseitarguesawomangainsfrommatingwithagoodhunterifhuntingis
a reliable signal of his phenotypic (or genotypic) quality (Gintis et al., 2001;
Hawkes & Bliege Bird, 2002; Zahavi, 1995). Hunting may be a good test
of some qualities because it is difﬁcult, and it may be a good way to signal
because sharing meat attracts a large audience (Smith & Bliege Bird, 2000).
When we focus on motivation, costly signaling comes close to being
a delayed, not-in-kind exchange of goods for services if it involves meat
and sex, but it could take other forms. For example, hunting success may
signal a man’s ﬁghting ability, which might cause other males to defer to
him in disputes. Deference is more difﬁcult to construe as a service. Here,
I deal only with signaling of phenotypic quality relevant to potential mates
because it is the most explicit and therefore testable scenario offered for how
costly signaling could work. Because costly signaling is meant to be about
communication and quite distinct from not-in-kind exchange, it could just
as well take the form of a forager acquiring lots of food and then, in front
of his audience, destroying it all rather than sharing it. Therefore, costly
signaling is not really an explanation of sharing per se but an explanation
of why foragers might be motivated to engage in costly behaviors. Those
costly behaviors might involve acquiring much food, which is then
given away.
(5) Tolerated Scrounging. With large packages of food, each additional unit
consumed will have diminishing marginal utility for the owner and greater
value for those who have not yet eaten, who should be more willing to
contest those units. If the cost of defending additional units is greater than
the beneﬁt, it pays to share them (Blurton Jones, 1984, 1987; Isaac, 1978).
Once scrounging occurs, production becomes a game of chicken (Hawkes,
1992), resulting in a mixed producer/scrounger strategy (Vickery et al.,
1991) and depressed production. Foods acquired with considerable daily
variance are more vulnerable to scrounging (Winterhalder, 1996), but they
are also the ones most likely to be exchanged in delayed reciprocity, making
it difﬁcult to test between these two hypotheses based on the types of food
distributed (Bliege-Bird & Bird, 1997; Kaplan & Hill, 1985).What Explains Hadza Food Sharing? 73
Motive vs. Pattern of Food Transfers
It is important to distinguish between the food giver’s desire to share, which I will
call motive, and the observed pattern of food transfers. Sometimes they coincide,
sometimes not. If the motivation for taking food back to camp is to feed one’s
siblings or children (which of course may be a conscious goal) in order to enhance
inclusive ﬁtness via nepotistic provisioning (not a conscious goal), and food is
given only to close kin, then the motive explains the pattern of food transfer and
vice versa. However, suppose one takes food back to camp to feed one’s children,
but once in camp others expect and receive shares. Then, although the motive was
nepotism, the transfer is explained by reciprocity or scrounging.
Of the six food sharing explanations in Table 2, only four imply the food
giver wants to give out food, two entail no desire to give (noted by a). Tolerated
scroungingexplainsonlywhyothersgetsharesregardlessofthewishesofthegiver,
and mutualism results in sharing only as an incidental by-product of synchronized
foraging.Ontheotherhand,costlysignalingismostlyanexplanationofmotive,not
an explanation of the particular pattern of food transfers. For example, tolerated
scrounging might explain why everyone gets some of the hunter’s meat, while
costly signaling is invoked only to explain why the hunter bothers to hunt. Costly
signalingcanbedistinguishedfromthetwotypesofreciprocity,butlikethemitim-
pliesthefoodgiverhasamotive,andthatmotiveistoreceivesomebeneﬁtinreturn
for foraging effort whatever the reason people are willing to confer the beneﬁt.
The food-sharing hypotheses are more distinct with regard to motivation for
sharing than they are with regard to predicted pattern of food transfers, yet there
has been little or no investigation of the motivation and decision-making involved.
Measuring only the pattern of food transfers is akin to noting only the mates
peoplehave,notwhotheywouldprefertohave.Withoutdataonmatepreferences,
we might erroneously assume that people are with their ideal mates. Likewise,
withoutdataonsharingpreferencesunconstrainedbyexternalpressures,wemight
erroneously conclude that food givers want to give away the amount of food they
do to the people they do.
Types of Food Sharing
Foodissharedinvariouscontextsandallofthehypothesesabovelikelyaccountfor
some of the sharing observed in different circumstances. For example, mutualism
might or might not account for the sharing of food between two foragers who eat
what they acquire on the spot, but cannot account for the sharing that occurs when
a forager takes food back to camp. Just as in complex societies, much forager food74 FRANK W. MARLOWE
Table 2. Motivation, Pattern of Transfers, and Game Predictions From
Hypotheses.
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household, often with everyone in camp, thus nepotism is a poor explanation (see
Jones(2000),however,foranexplanationofgroupnepotism).Finally,not-in-kind
food exchange occurs among foragers, especially between husband and wife, with




offoodtakenbacktocamp,Iexcludethosehypotheses.Instead,hereIaminterestedWhat Explains Hadza Food Sharing? 75
inexplainingthewidespreadsharingoffoodacrosshouseholdsincamp.Therefore,
I focus only on the three hypotheses most relevant to this type of food sharing: (a)
delayed, in-kind reciprocity; (b) costly signaling; and (c) tolerated scrounging.
Game Predictions
If we assume players’ decisions in the ultimatum and dictator games are guided
by predispositions they have when sharing food, we can make the following nine
predictions from the three different food-sharing hypotheses (see Table 2).
For delayed, in-kind reciprocity to work well, there needs to be a contingent,
somewhat balanced ﬂow of food, at least in terms of utility (Winterhalder, 1996).
Individuals also need a strong commitment to fairness; without it, free riding
would erode the incentive to produce. The best strategy to promote in-kind
reciprocity is the so-called tit-for-tat strategy of cooperate until defected upon.
Sharingequallywithone’spartnersisagoodwaytosignalthatoneiscooperating,
so if delayed, in-kind reciprocity accounts for food sharing, we should expect a
stronger commitment to fairness in a society where there is extensive food sharing
than in a society where there is less extensive food sharing. Therefore, we can
predict that (1) subjects like the Hadza will make high UG and DG offers. By
high, I mean at least as high as offers in complex societies where there is less
food sharing. Delayed reciprocity requires detecting cheaters to avoid cooperating
with them in the future, and because this becomes more difﬁcult as population
increases, free-riders should increase and undermine delayed reciprocity in large
groups(Boyd&Richerson,1988).Wecanthereforepredictthat(2)subjectsliving
in larger camps should make lower UG and DG offers. Punishment can maintain
delayed reciprocity, and even though it is a public good upon which others can
free-ride,wemightexpectmoralisticaggressiontowardcheaters(Fehr&Gachter,
2002; Trivers, 1971) and predict that (3) low UG offers will be rejected at high
rates (at least as high as in complex societies).
Costly signaling implies foragers want to share their food as a means of
advertising their phenotypic quality. Therefore, we can predict that (4) subjects
will make high UG and DG offers, perhaps 50% or even greater. If advertising
one’s quality leads to more frequent mating opportunities (or better allies), men
might stand to gain more than women do from advertising. Therefore, if it is
huntingsuccessthatisthesignal,wecanpredictthat(5)menwillmakehigherUG
and DG offers than women (though not if both sexes gain equally from signaling
generosity to gain “social beneﬁts”). Because there are more potential mates or
allies to advertise to and more beneﬁts to be had in larger groups, we can predict
that (6) subjects will make higher UG and DG offers in larger camps.76 FRANK W. MARLOWE
Tolerated scrounging implies the food giver does not really want to give food,
therefore we can predict that (7) subjects will make the lowest possible UG offers
that do not provoke rejection (income maximizing offers), and give 0% in the DG.
The relative dominance of individuals might inﬂuence tolerated scrounging. For
example, a female leopard sometimes loses her prey to a male leopard, until he is
sated. If weaker individuals gang-up on the stronger however, dominance should
matter less and the number of scroungers more. For example, a pack of hyenas
often steals prey from a leopard, and so do the Hadza. This is theft, pure and
simple, which occurs more between groups while tolerated scrounging occurs
more within groups. Because the number of potential scroungers and pressure to
share is greater in larger groups, we can predict that (8) subjects will be inclined
to make higher UG and DG offers in larger camps. Finally, because tolerated
scrounging is based on others claiming shares (perhaps equal shares) and their
feeling of entitlement is what drives sharing, we can predict that (9) low UG
offers will be rejected at high rates.
Anonymity in the games means there is no way a proposer’s offer can be
reciprocated, nor is there an audience to signal or advertise to, nor is there anyone
applying scrounging pressure. Thus, the games alter the conditions of real food
sharing.Thisisadrawbacksinceonemightarguethat,withoutone’sidentitybeing
known, there is no reason for one to advertise. However, the anonymity is also an
advantage since it allows us to see more clearly what people will do when they are
free to decide. For the predictions to make sense, we need only assume that game
decisions are guided by something like an impulse or a norm that is internalized,
whichistheproductofdailylifeinaparticularsociety.Forexample,wemightﬁnd
that people in a society with competitive feasting and gift-giving make very high
offers, despite anonymity. We might also expect these games to elicit fair offers
fromthosewhobelievestronglyinfairness,whichappearstobethecaseincomplex
societies,where50%isthemostcommonofferevenwhenpartnersareanonymous.
Hadza Foraging and Sharing
TheHadzaaremobile,egalitarianhunter-gathererswholiveinasavanna-woodland
habitat in northern Tanzania and number about 1000 (Blurton Jones et al., 1992).
They live in camps that are ﬂexible in composition with an average population of
29(10–130),andmoveaboutevery1–2monthsinresponsetoseveralfactors,such
as availability of water and berries. The Hadza are not territorial and people are
free to move wherever they please, though a core group of people tends to rotate
through the same sites. Large camps are noticeably different from small camps.
There is more segregation by sex in large camps with men sitting together in theWhat Explains Hadza Food Sharing? 77
Fig. 1. DailyKilocaloriesBroughtIntoCampbyHadzaMalesandFemalesByAge.Note:
Regression lines are lowess smooth.
men’s place under the best shade tree, and women together under the second best
shade tree. As the Hadza often note, there is a lot more bickering in large camps.
I also found that men provide less direct care to their biological children in larger
camps (Marlowe, 1999).
Based on my data collected on 187 people in ﬁve camps over 10 months in
1995/1996, Hadza men (n = 51) forage 5.7 hours and women (n = 59) 4.2 hours
perday.Hadzawomendigtubersandgatherfruitwhilemenmostlyhuntmammals
and birds and collect honey and fruit. Hadza females acquire 60% and males 40%
of daily kilocalories (kcal) brought into camp, but among adults, it is 55 and 45%
respectively (Fig. 1). Among couples with a nursing infant however, husbands
contribute 69% and their wives 31% of daily kcals (Marlowe, 2003). These data
only include the food that is brought back to camp, not the roughly 30% that is
consumed while out foraging.
Unlessmenﬁndalotofhoney,whichaccountsformuchofmen’sfood(Table3),
they may eat all they ﬁnd and take no honey back to camp, and such production is
missing from these data. Men also eat some small game on the spot but medium
sized game, like gazelle, is carried back to camp. When men kill very large game,
like buffalo or giraffe, they sometimes take as much as they can carry back to
camp, then others go to the kill site and butcher and carry back their own portions.
Sharing of very large game in such cases then consists of merely telling others78 FRANK W. MARLOWE
Table 3. Percentages of Total Diet (in Kilocalories by Food Type) Brought Into
Camp by Adult Men and Women, and People of all Ages.
Food Acquired by Berries Tubers Honey Baobab Meat Maize/Millet Total
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Both sexes (all ages) 17.2 23.5 14.2 19.2 19.3 6.6 100
Women (≥18 years old) 24.8 38.8 0.7 25.6 1.2 8.9 100
Men (≥18 years old) 6.3 5.0 30.2 13.8 39.6 5.1 100
where the carcass is. Men usually hunt alone. During the late dry season however,
they often hunt at night, waiting in ambush at waterholes, always in pairs because
large carnivores that use the same strategy pose a danger. After an animal is shot,
men often return to camp and wait for the poison to kill the animal. Then, other
men go with them to follow the blood trail and tracks. Men’s foods, such as meat
and honey, that do make it back to camp do so with greater variance and tend to
be shared more widely outside the household than women’s foods (Table 3).
Fig. 2. Adult Hadza Producers, Scroungers, and Super-Producers by Camp Population.
Note: Number of foragers (age 15–69 years old) who brought different amounts of daily
kilocalories of food into camp by total population of camp. Adults who brought in <1000
daily kcal (scroungers) were likely being subsidized by producers (1–3000 daily kcal) and
super-producers (>3000 daily kcal). Note the absolute number of scroungers (free-riders)
increases with population, which might partly explain the greater amount of bickering in
large camps.What Explains Hadza Food Sharing? 79
When women dig for tubers, they go in groups of 3–10. They sometimes
cooperate by helping each other lever boulders up to get at tubers, and usually
roast and eat some before returning to camp with the bulk of their haul. When
picking berries, women will eat many but will also ﬁll up baskets and take them
back, whereas men and children tend to eat all they pick. We can therefore infer
that women share berries more than men or children, and not all of this sharing
is within the household. During the berry season, the bulk of the diet is berries,
and since most are eaten while foraging, they surely comprise a greater percent
of the total diet consumed than the 17% shown in Table 3. Hadza children forage
for themselves from a very early age, and are able to meet about half their needs
by the time they are 10 (Blurton Jones et al., 1989; Hawkes et al., 1995), but take
back to camp a lower percentage of what they acquire than adults do.
If we assume people who bring in less than 1000 daily kcal are more often
receiving food from others, we can see that the absolute number (not the percent)
of adult scroungers increases with population (Fig. 2), supporting the prediction
that free riders should increase with group size. A few individuals in this sample
were disabled or very old and did not forage at all (the very old are excluded in
Fig.2sinceageis<70years).Thecampswith24and29peoplehadthehighestper-
centage of adults who were being subsidized by close kin. Nepotistic provisioning
is one obvious motive for taking food back to camp, while another is provisioning,
Fig. 3. Daily Kilocalories of Food Brought Into Camp by Adult Hadza by Age. Note:
Status of those with and without dependents: ×’s and dashed line = not married and have
no biological child ≤8 years old at home; squares and solid line = married and/or have at
leastonebiologicalchild≤8yearsoldathome(statisticsareforamultiplelinearregression,
controlling for age; regression lines are lowess smooth).80 FRANK W. MARLOWE
or trading with, a mate. Controlling for age, people who had a biological child
≤8 years old at home, and/or were married, took back to camp signiﬁcantly more
dailykilocaloriesoffoodthandidsinglepeoplewithoutyoungbiologicalchildren
at home (Fig. 3). Some young, singles (males and females) do bring in many
daily kcals (note the 20 year-olds in Fig. 3), perhaps because having a reputation
as a good forager helps one acquire a better mate. “Good forager” is frequently
cited by males and females as an important trait in a potential mate (Marlowe,
2004a) and there appears to be assortative mating with respect to foraging returns






with stakes laid out in front of the player who sat across from me. The stakes in
the UG were 2000 Tanzania shillings (US$3.08), about a day’s wage in Tanzania.
Because the Hadza are not very familiar with numbers, I used ten 200 shillings
bills, which they could move around to make it easier for them to add and subtract.
Iﬁrstquizzedparticipantsandscoredtheircomprehensionbyhowmanyexamples
it took them to get correct answers with imaginary UG offers. In the DG, instead
of money I used 10 containers of beads of about the same value. For more detail
on methods see (Marlowe, 2004b).
RESULTS
The Ultimatum Game
There were 55 pairs of players, 55 males (27 proposers, 28 responders) and 55
females (28 proposers, 27 responders), mean age = 37 years (range 17–70 years).
In contrast to the modal offer of 50% that is typical of industrialized societies
(Camerer & Thaler, 1995), the Hadza modal offer was 20% (median = 30%,
SD = 17, n = 55) (Fig. 4). Hadza offers were signiﬁcantly lower than U.S. offers
among Los Angeles graduate students (Henrich, 2000) (Mann-Whitney U = 174,
p < 0.0005, n = 70).
Hadza proposers earned signiﬁcantly more than responders did (47% vs. 29%,
t = 3.61,p<0.0005,df = 98.2,unequalvariances).However,theHadzarejectedWhat Explains Hadza Food Sharing? 81
Fig. 4. Number of Hadza Proposers Making Various Offers in the Ultimatum Game.
24% of all offers (mean offer rejected = 18%, 0–40%). Thus, like people in
complex societies, they were quite willing to reject. For example, 39% of all
offers ≤30% were rejected. The maximum possible overall earnings equal 50%
per person when there are no rejections and group beneﬁt is maximized, but
because Hadza offers were low and rejections high, their overall earnings were
low (mean = 38.1%, SD = 27.5, range = 0–90%, n = 110).
Inamultiplelinearregressionanalysisofage,sex,numberofchildren,numberof
siblings, comprehension, and camp population size, the only signiﬁcant predictor
of offers was camp population size (Table 4). Offers were higher in larger camps
( = 0.475,p<0.0005,df = 48)(Fig.5).Whentheonelargestcampisexcluded,
Hadza offers are much lower and not bimodal (mode = 20%, median = 20%,
Table 4. Ultimatum and Dictator Game Multiple Regression Results.
Variables (Relationship Ultimatum (Money as Stakes) Dictator (Beads as Stakes)
to Proposer’s Offers)
 p  p
Age −0.097 0.562 −0.017 0.926
Sex (m = 1; f = 2) −0.174 0.199 −0.203 0.153
Comprehension 0.277 0.067
Number of siblings 0.010 0.943 −0.196 0.162
Number of children −0.077 0.634 0.040 0.824
Camp population size 0.475 <0.0005 0.544 <0.000582 FRANK W. MARLOWE
Fig. 5. Hadza Ultimatum Game Offers by Camp Population Size. Note: B = 0.475, p <
0.0005, df = 48.
Fig. 6. Number of Hadza Proposers Making Various Offers in the Dictator Game. Note:
Mode = 10%, Median = 20%, SD = 16%, n = 43.What Explains Hadza Food Sharing? 83
Fig. 7. Hadza Dictator Game Offers by Camp Population Size. Note: B = 0.544, p <
0.0005, df = 34.
SD = 15.6, n = 29), which is probably a better reﬂection of Hadza norms given
that the largest camp was unusually large. Comprehension was not correlated with
camp population size and neither was the rejection rate. However, offers of ≤20%
were more often rejected in the largest camp than the other smaller camps (80%
or 4/5 vs. 30% or 5/16), which might explain the higher offers in the largest camp
in the UG.
When asked why they made the offers they did, eight of the nine people who
made offers of 50% said something like, “Giving half, or splitting it equally, is
good,” while four of the ﬁfteen who made offers ≤20% said something like, “I
wanted to keep a lot of the money.” Many could not explain why they decided to
give so little but some came up with a variety of rationalizations like, “I’m older,”
or “My partner is my friend and will understand.”
The Dictator Game
In contrast to the DG modal offer of 30–50% in complex societies (Camerer
& Thaler, 1995), the modal offer for the Hadza was 10% (median = 20%,
SD = 16.2%, n = 43) (Fig. 6). In a multiple linear regression analysis of age,
sex, number of children, number of siblings, and camp population size, the
only signiﬁcant predictor of offers was again camp population size ( = 0.544,
p < 0.0005, df = 34) (Fig. 7).84 FRANK W. MARLOWE
DISCUSSION
Tolerated scrounging is the hypothesis best supported by the game results here
(Table 2). The only support for delayed reciprocity was the high rejection rate
of low UG offers. The only support for costly signaling was the higher offers in
larger camps. Most of the predictions of tolerated scrounging were supported. As
predicted, offers were low by comparison to complex societies, offers were higher
in larger camps, and there was a high rejection rate of low UG offers. On the other
hand, DG offers were not zero percent as predicted by tolerated scrounging. This
suggests that most proposers felt some impulse to be generous.
When I tell people about these games, they usually guess that the Hadza, or
any foragers who regularly share food extensively, would make more generous
UG and DG offers than people would in complex societies. Why do they think
this? Presumably, because they assume it is generosity that motivates food sharing
and that these games will elicit this. One would be hard-pressed to ﬁnd a society
with more extensive food sharing than the Hadza, yet they made lower offers in




and were much more risk-neutral than proposers in any other society tested in
the MacArthur project or in complex societies (Marlowe, 2004b). Considering the
Hadza can only be described as having a strong sharing ethic (which is reﬂected in
theirhighrejectionrate),itappearstheethicappliesmoretoothersthantooneself.
The Hadza expect a fair share of what others have. In real life, unlike the UG,
this expectation is rational since the Hadza rarely face a one-shot decision but
can instead keep pressure on until someone hands over a fair share. Among the
Hadza, no begging or threatening is required to get food from others. The mere
sight of someone’s food seems to sufﬁce, though this applies to some foods more
than others. No one would think a man stingy if he shared a small bird only with
his children, but large game could never be kept within the household. Although
there are no precise and formal rules about division (except for certain pieces
called epeme meat, that can only be eaten by men), large game is pretty equally
distributed to everyone in camp, with only slightly more going to the hunter in the
case of the largest game animals (Hawkes et al., 2001b).
A common misconception is that meat is shared because it will spoil and be
worth nothing to the hunter anyway. However, the Hadza often eat very rotten,
week-old meat they scavenge from carnivores. In addition, the Hadza (and many
other foragers) know how to preserve meat by drying it. They rarely do so because
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than a week because word spreads (sometimes despite efforts to keep it a secret)
and people come from other camps to acquire shares. Fully 27.2% of the meat
consumed in 1995/1996 came from camps other than the one within which the
consumer was residing.
Hadza men have tried to hide meat inside my Land Rover, hoping to increase
their chances of having an affair in the camp we were going to visit. However, try
astheymight,theyfailedbecauseitistoodifﬁculttohidemeatandtheyeventually
hadtogiveitawaytoeveryonepresent.Honeyisalsosharedoutsidethehousehold,
but because it can be carried in a small gourd, a man can sometimes sneak it into
his hut. Once a man hid his honey under my Land Rover all afternoon, in hopes of
sneaking it into his house to share with his family but when he ﬁnally retrieved it,
others saw it and he shared it with everyone. On the other hand, I have seen a man
in a large camp successfully sneak honey into his house where he shared it with
his wife, child, and two teenage girls.
Hadza say that people who do not share are bad people and that they will
move away from them. Being accused of stinginess in a large group could be
more dangerous than being accused by one or two people in a small group, which
might explain why people felt compelled to make higher offers in large camps.
Punishment is a public-good upon which others can free ride, as illustrated by
rejection rates in the ultimatum game. Players are motivated to make higher offers
in the game because a few will punish – one Hadza rejected an offer of 40%,
and several rejected 30%. Other responders accepted lower offers and made more
money than the spiteful punishers made. Even though offers were anonymous,
perhaps the Hadza have a greater fear of punishment in larger camps with their
greater bickering. The higher percent of rejections of low offers (≤20%) in the




that in the very smallest camp in Fig. 2 there were no free-riders. In a large camp
there may be 20–30 households and at times, everyone may be sitting on one side
of the camp, which means that someone can more easily sneak food into their hut
on the other side of camp. In large camps, people will occasionally wait until dark
to return and then discreetly signal me to come weigh their food before sneaking
it into their huts.
Centralplaceforagingincreasestheopportunityforscroungingbecauseanyone
who returns to camp with food is likely to encounter others who are in camp
without food at the time. If tolerated scrounging explains the pattern of camp-
wide food transfers, we must ask why people take food back to camp. Household
provisioning, as Fig. 3 suggests, is probably the primary motivation, especially86 FRANK W. MARLOWE
for females who have weaned toddlers who are too difﬁcult to take foraging.
Under circumstances when food distribution can be controlled, for example, when
someone sneaks food in, my impression is that it is given preferentially to close
kin and mates. Males may acquire the foods most subject to scrounging in order
to signal their quality, especially when young and trying to establish reputations.
However, once they have children, even males often appear to want to direct food
to their households but simply lose much of their food to scrounging.
My impression is that costly signaling, delayed reciprocity, and tolerated
scroungingallplaysomeroleinexplainingfoodsharingacrossHadzahouseholds.
The game results, however, are most consistent with tolerated scrounging. In
evolutionary perspective, the way the Hadza played these games makes sense;
they wanted to keep a larger share for themselves, yet wanted others to give
them an equal share. The Hadza do not steal anything from other people, only
from other species (I have avoided the term tolerated theft because it is too easily
misunderstoodasoutrighttheft).Whenitcomestofood,onedoesnotneedtosteal
because it simply must be shared with anyone who sees it. The Hadza share their
food on a daily basis with many others while we in complex societies do not. Only
when one experiences such constant demands to share can one fully appreciate
how strong the desire can be to escape it.
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